For many Italian hotels, the problem is no longer selling rooms. It is staying financially viable while those rooms are being sold.
In 2025, the Italian hotel market is facing a paradox that owners, lenders, investors and operators can no longer afford to ignore: tourism demand remains strong, but part of the hotel sector is becoming increasingly fragile from a financial and capital-structure perspective.
Many hotels are open. Some are posting solid occupancy. Several destinations continue to benefit from resilient domestic and international demand. Yet beneath the apparent strength of tourism flows, a less visible and more dangerous form of weakness is emerging: pressure on margins, liquidity, debt service, deferred capex and long-term asset value.
The issue is no longer simply how many rooms a hotel can sell.
The issue is whether those rooms generate enough cash to cover payroll, suppliers, energy, rent or business-lease payments, lenders, tax authorities, maintenance and repositioning investment.
This is where the market is splitting.
On one side are hotels with disciplined financial control, clear positioning, sustainable debt structures and the ability to reinvest.
On the other are properties that still attract demand but are gradually consuming liquidity, eroding real estate value and weakening their own continuity.
In 2025, the Italian hotel crisis is not demand-driven.
It is a crisis of fragile operating models and unsustainable capital structures.
The 2025 numbers: liquidation pressure remains high, while restructuring tools are still underused
The closest publicly available dataset to the hotel sector is Italy’s ATECO section I, covering accommodation and food service activities. This perimeter is broader than hotels alone, as it also includes restaurants and other accommodation-related activities, but it remains the most useful official proxy for measuring insolvency pressure across the broader hospitality industry.
In 2025, this perimeter recorded:
| Procedure | 2025 figure |
|---|---|
| Court-ordered liquidations | 912 |
| Concordato preventivo procedures | 44 |
| Going-concern concordato procedures | Not publicly available |
The figure must be read carefully. The 912 court-ordered liquidations do not represent the exact number of hotels entering liquidation. They refer to the wider accommodation and food service perimeter.
However, a prudent hotel-only estimate suggests a meaningful order of magnitude:
| Estimated hotel-only perimeter, 2025 | Court-ordered liquidations | Concordato preventivo procedures |
|---|---|---|
| Hotel sector only | 70-85 | 6-10 |
This should not be treated as an official administrative count. It should be read as a strategic indicator: a non-negligible number of Italian hotels are reaching distress through liquidation proceedings, often too late to preserve asset value.
And this is the core issue. In the hotel sector, a crisis addressed too late does not merely create an accounting problem. It destroys goodwill, weakens operational continuity, damages online reputation, accelerates property deterioration and reduces negotiating leverage with lenders and investors.
The 2022-2025 trend: liquidations are rising, while preventive restructuring remains limited
The historical trend makes the issue even clearer.
| Year | Concordato preventivo procedures, ATECO section I | Court-ordered liquidations, ATECO section I |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 53 | 689 |
| 2023 | 56 | 776 |
| 2024 | 50 | 902 |
| 2025 | 44 | 912 |
Court-ordered liquidations increased from 689 in 2022 to 912 in 2025, a rise of approximately 32% within the accommodation and food service perimeter.
By contrast, concordato preventivo procedures did not increase. In 2025, they fell to 44.
This imbalance is the real warning sign: many businesses are reaching liquidation more often than they are entering an orderly restructuring process.
For hotels, this is particularly serious because operational continuity has a direct impact on asset value. A hotel is not simply a building with rooms. It is a live economic platform made up of guests, reputation, employees, suppliers, licences, distribution channels, commercial relationships, management know-how and market positioning.
Once continuity is interrupted, value does not remain static.
It deteriorates.
Why a hotel can become distressed even when it has guests
One of the most common mistakes in hospitality is confusing occupancy with financial sustainability.
A hotel can sell rooms and still fail to generate enough cash.
It can produce revenue but insufficient EBITDA.
It can occupy a strong location but operate an obsolete product.
It can have theoretical real estate value but an operating model unable to convert that value into yield.
In 2025, hotel distress is often driven by a combination of factors:
| Critical area | Impact on the hotel |
|---|---|
| Labour costs | Pressure on operating margins |
| Energy and supplies | Higher fixed and variable costs |
| Bank debt | Increased cash-flow absorption |
| Rent or business-lease agreements | Structural rigidity in the income statement |
| Deferred maintenance | Loss of product competitiveness |
| Insufficient capex | Limited ability to reposition the asset |
| Weak governance | Late or non-technical decisions |
| Poor revenue management | Revenue below the asset’s potential |
| OTA dependency | Margin erosion through commissions |
| Selective credit conditions | Reduced refinancing capacity |
The point is straightforward: occupancy is no longer enough.
A healthy hotel is not merely a hotel that sells rooms.
It is a hotel that generates cash, services debt, remunerates capital, reinvests in the product and maintains margins consistent with both operating risk and real estate risk.
Warning signs hotel owners should not ignore
Hotel distress rarely appears overnight. It sends signals first. The problem is that those signals are often minimised, rationalised or postponed.
The most dangerous warning signs include:
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delayed tax or social security payments;
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suppliers being paid on increasingly extended terms;
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bank exposures renegotiated multiple times;
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permanent reliance on short-term credit lines;
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increasing difficulty financing low-season liquidity needs;
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maintenance postponed due to lack of cash;
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falling operating margins despite rooms being sold;
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growing dependence on OTAs and intermediaries;
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difficulty retaining qualified staff;
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tensions with banks, landlords or leasing companies;
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absence of a credible business plan;
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valuable real estate but insufficient liquidity.
When these signals begin to overlap, the risk is no longer merely operational. It becomes patrimonial.
The hotel may gradually move along a much more dangerous path: financial stress, unlikely-to-pay classification, credit deterioration, non-performing loan status, enforcement action, loss of control over the asset or court-ordered liquidation.
For a deeper discussion of this issue, see the related article on RobertoNecci.it: Hotel in crisis: how to avoid UTP, NPL and asset loss before it is too late.
The decisive question: can the hotel be restructured as a going concern, or is it simply consuming residual value?
Every financially stressed hotel should be assessed starting from one central question:
can the hotel still be restructured as a going concern, or is it merely consuming residual value?
The answer cannot be emotional. It must be technical.
A proper assessment requires an integrated review of several areas:
| Area of analysis | Strategic question |
|---|---|
| Operating margin | Is the hotel generating real EBITDA or only turnover? |
| Debt | Can cash flow support lenders, suppliers and tax liabilities? |
| Rent or lease structure | Is the lease or business-lease agreement sustainable? |
| Property condition | What capex is required to maintain or relaunch the product? |
| Market fundamentals | Does the destination have sufficient forward demand? |
| Positioning | Is the hotel priced and marketed correctly for its segment? |
| Management | Is there a team capable of changing the trajectory? |
| Investor appeal | Can the asset attract external capital? |
| Continuity | Does continued operation preserve or increase value? |
If the hotel can still be restructured, the priority must be to prevent distress from turning into a formal insolvency procedure.
Potential solutions may include debt restructuring, new equity, an orderly sale, a business-lease transaction, replacement management, creditor agreements, negotiated settlement or a concordato preventivo aimed at preserving business continuity.
If intervention comes too late, negotiation space narrows. At that point, the process is no longer driven by the owner. Creditors, lenders, the court or the distressed market begin to determine timing, terms and residual value.
Why court-ordered liquidation is often value-destructive for hotels
Court-ordered liquidation may be unavoidable when the situation is already compromised. But in the hotel sector, it is often the outcome that destroys the greatest amount of value.
A hotel is not a warehouse.
It is not an industrial shed.
It is not a static asset.
It is a delicate combination of:
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real estate;
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licences and authorisations;
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employees;
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online reputation;
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guest relationships;
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commercial contracts;
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suppliers;
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tour operator and OTA relationships;
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distribution channels;
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operating history;
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market positioning;
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business continuity.
When this system is interrupted, value deteriorates quickly.
A closed or discontinuously managed hotel may lose appeal for investors and operators. Online reputation stops building or begins to decline. Qualified staff leave. Suppliers withdraw previous terms. Repeat guests move to competitors. Maintenance needs increase. Reopening costs rise.
For this reason, in hotel distress, continuity is not merely a legal concept. It is an economic mechanism for value preservation.
Concordato and going-concern tools remain underused
The ratio between liquidations and concordato procedures reveals a structural weakness.
In 2025, within the accommodation and food service perimeter, there were 912 court-ordered liquidations compared with only 44 concordato preventivo procedures.
This imbalance suggests that many crises reach the judicial stage only when the window for an orderly solution has already narrowed.
In the hotel sector, early intervention can make the difference between:
| Crisis addressed too late | Crisis managed through continuity |
|---|---|
| Loss of the asset | Preservation of value |
| NPL or enforcement action | Negotiated restructuring |
| Hotel closure | Operational continuity |
| Real estate devaluation | New capital or a new operator |
| Reputational damage | Commercial relaunch |
| Forced sale | Orderly disposal or value-enhancement strategy |
Concordato preventivo, negotiated settlements, restructuring agreements and industrial takeover structures should not be considered only when it is already too late. They should be assessed while there is still value to protect.
Where risk and opportunity overlap
The regions with the greatest hotel capacity and economic density are also those where risk can most easily turn into investment opportunity.
Areas such as Lazio, Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna, Veneto and Tuscany combine three decisive factors:
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significant hotel supply;
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deep tourism markets;
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potential interest from investors, operators and industrial players.
This does not mean that every distressed hotel is an opportunity. Many distressed assets are weak because they no longer have the right product, market position, margins or governance.
But it does mean that hotel distress must be analysed with method.
The question is not: “How much does the hotel cost?”
The correct question is: how much value can still be recovered if intervention takes place before distress destroys continuity, reputation and income-generating capacity?
What owners, lenders and investors should do
For hotel owners
The first mistake is waiting.
When a hotel enters financial stress, time does not protect ownership. It weakens it.
Every month of delay can mean:
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less liquidity;
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more overdue debt;
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weaker negotiating power;
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deteriorating lender relationships;
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higher legal risk;
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staff losses;
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postponement of essential maintenance;
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lower perceived value for investors.
The question should not be: “How do we get through the next season?”
The question should be: which transaction protects the value of the hotel over the next 12 to 36 months?
For lenders
Lenders must distinguish between a compromised business and a recoverable asset.
A distressed hotel is not automatically a loan to be liquidated. It may be a business to reorganise, a property to reposition, a management platform to replace or an operation to be transferred to a more efficient operator.
Managing hotel credit exposure requires a different approach from many other sectors. Looking only at the debt position is not enough. The key question is the recoverable value of the asset.
For investors
2025 opens an interesting phase for hotel investors, but only for those with integrated expertise.
Distressed hotels are not simply bought “at a discount”.
They must be analysed, structured, financed, managed and relaunched.
This requires expertise in:
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hotel finance;
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real estate;
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operations;
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revenue management;
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insolvency and restructuring law;
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tax;
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contracts;
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debt restructuring;
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commercial repositioning;
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management selection.
In today’s market, the winner is not the investor who looks only at price.
The winner is the investor who can distinguish between a hotel in crisis and a hotel that can be recovered.
The new cycle of the Italian hotel market
2025 marks an important shift: the market is becoming more selective.
For years, part of the sector confused tourism growth with business strength. But a hotel is not strong because it captures demand. It is strong if it converts that demand into margin, cash flow and asset value.
The new cycle will reward:
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hotels with advanced management control;
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owners willing to open up to capital and professional management;
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operators with industrial capabilities;
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investors able to identify recoverable value;
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lenders willing to evaluate alternatives to liquidation;
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continuity-based transactions over forced sales and value-destructive procedures.
It will penalise:
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undercapitalised properties;
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outdated family-run models;
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hotels without clear positioning;
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assets requiring capex that cannot be financed;
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management teams operating without reliable data;
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businesses that react only when the crisis has already become a legal procedure.
The Italian hotel market is not simply going through a difficult phase.
It is entering a phase of selection.
The real risk is not distress. It is addressing distress too late.
The 2025 figures on court-ordered liquidations should not be interpreted as a crisis of Italian tourism. They should be read as evidence of a deeper transformation: the hotel market is no longer forgiving financially fragile models.
A hotel may have demand but no equilibrium.
It may sell rooms but generate no margin.
It may have real estate value but no liquidity.
It may have history but no industrial future.
The difference between a restructured hotel and a lost hotel often depends on timing.
When distress is identified early, alternatives still exist: continuity, restructuring, new management, fresh capital, orderly sale, business lease, repositioning and creditor agreements.
When distress is ignored, the path narrows: UTP, NPL, enforcement action, loss of control, insolvency proceedings and liquidation.
In the hotel sector, waiting can cost more than acting.
Is your hotel under financial pressure, exposed to critical bank debt or at risk of losing value?
Hotel Management Group supports owners, investors, lenders and operators in assessing distressed hotels, designing continuity-based solutions, restructuring operations and enhancing the value of complex hotel assets.
Before financial stress becomes a UTP, an NPL, a legal procedure or the loss of the asset, request a confidential assessment from Hotel Management Group.
Roberto Necci
